Secrecy and Safety by Andrew Daughety & Jennifer Reinganum
American Law & Economics
Association Annual Meetings
Year 2004 Paper 30
Secrecy and Safety
Andrew F. Daughety Jennifer F. Reinganum
Vanderbilt University Vanderbilt University
This working paper site is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be
commercially reproduced without the publisher's permission.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art30
Copyright c 











* This research was supported by NSF Grant SES-0239908.  We thank Jon Hamilton, Xinyu Hua,
the referees, the Co-Editor, and participants in seminars at the University of Southern California,
the University of Virginia and Vanderbilt University for comments on an earlier version.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressSecrecy and Safety
Andrew F.  Daughety*
Jennifer F.  Reinganum*
ABSTRACT
We employ a simple two-period model to show that the use of confidential settlement as a
strategy for a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average safety of products sold than that which
would be produced if a firm were committed to openness.  Moreover, confidentiality can even cause
this measure to decline over time.  We also show that a rational risk-neutral consumer’s response
to a market environment, wherein a firm engages in confidential settlement agreements, may be to
reduce demand.  We discuss how firm profitability is influenced by the decision to have open or
confidential settlements; all else equal, a firm following a policy of openness will incur higher
liability and R&D costs, though product demand will not be diminished (as it may be for a firm
employing confidentiality).  Further, we characterize the choice of informational regime, providing
conditions such that, if the cost of credible auditing (to verify openness) is low enough, a firm will
choose to pay for auditing and eschew confidentiality.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art301.  Introduction
What is the effect of secrecy about the existence or extent of product-generated harms on the
provision of safe products?  Such secrecy naturally arises when firms negotiate and settle lawsuits
(filed by harmed product users) with “sealing” orders provided by courts, or private “contracts of
silence,” that keep everything from initial discovery through the actual details of a settlement secret,
under pain of court-enforced contempt citations or damages for breach of contract, respectively.
1
According to attorneys, these practices are widespread and routine in products liability cases.
2
Recent revelations of the past sexual abuse of minors by priests, much of which was concealed by
confidential settlements, make clear that this practice is not confined to product markets alone.
3
We employ a simple two-period model to show that the use of confidential settlement as a
strategy for a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average quality of inputs used, and lower
average safety of products sold, than that which would be produced if a firm were committed to
openness.  Moreover, confidentiality can even cause this latter measure to decline over time.  We
also show that a rational risk-neutral consumer’s response to a market environment, wherein a firm
engages in confidential settlement agreements, may be to reduce demand.  Finally, we discuss how
firm profitability is influenced by the decision to have open or confidential settlements; all else
equal, a firm following a policy of openness will incur higher liability and R&D costs, though
product demand will not be diminished (as it may be for a firm employing confidentiality).
Moreover, an open firm may face costs of making the commitment to openness credible.
4
The extensive provision of secrecy by courts is becoming, both for the states and the federal
government, an important policy issue.  For some time, approximately one-fifth of the states (and
the federal government) have been considering eliminating or severely restricting confidentiality,
though the focus of such “sunshine” laws tends to be only about conditions that significantly
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endanger public health and safety (leaving much of products liability untouched).   Recently all
federal judges in one state (South Carolina) agreed to no longer provide confidentiality in
“everything from products liability cases to child-molestation claims and medical malpractice
suits.”
5
The legal literature on confidentiality is quite large; for a discussion of some of the
(conflicting) legal issues, see Miller (1991), Doggett and Mucchetti (1991), Garfield (1998), Dore
(1999) and Fromm (2001).  There are basically three arguments made by those desiring elimination
of confidentiality and three arguments made by those in favor of continuing to allow confidentiality.
Those favoring eliminating confidentiality stress the benefits to third parties:  1) other injured people
who have not realized they may have a cause of action (both consumers who bought the product and
were harmed, as well as non-consumers harmed by externalities, such as occur in second-hand
smoke or toxic chemical spills) will realize that they have a case; 2) further risks to health and safety
will be averted; and 3) discovery sharing among plaintiffs harmed by the same product (which might
improve the viability of plaintiffs’ cases, or reduce the costs associated with pursuing a suit) will be
facilitated.
6  Those favoring continuing to allow confidential settlements argue that:  4) discovery
sharing is likely to inspire nuisance suits; 5) important privacy interests of the parties, such as
protecting trade secrets or highly personal information, will be protected; and 6) many settlements
are made contingent upon sealing (promoting settlement is an important goal of the civil justice
system; see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a), Yeazell, 1996).
Related Literature
This paper naturally fits into (and bridges) two literatures, namely that concerned with
signaling product quality via price, and that concerned with confidentiality and bargaining.  Previous
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art303
papers in which a monopoly signals quality via price include Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Bagwell
(1992) and Daughety and Reinganum (1995).
7  This paper abstracts from competitive considerations
such as entry or the presence of other firms, as well as advertising and other non-price avenues for
signaling, but expands the quality signaling model to consider a continuum type-space which is
endogenously determined by the firm’s decision to retain or replace an input.  It is closest to
Daughety and Reinganum (1995), since (as there) the post-market-transaction continuation game
reflects the firm’s liability for harms due to its choices regarding safety provision.
The economics literature concerned with confidentiality and bargaining is much smaller.
Yang (1996) briefly discusses exogenously-determined regimes of confidentiality or openness and
their effect on sequential bargaining by a defendant with a series of plaintiffs. Daughety and
Reinganum (1999, 2002) also consider a sequence of settlement bargaining games, but model
bargaining as being over both money and the choice of confidentiality versus openness.  Noe and
Wang (forthcoming) provide a model of confidentiality in sequential negotiations in which a buyer
faces a sequence of sellers.  They show that, when the items to be purchased are sufficiently
complementary, it is profitable for the buyer to randomize the order in which he approaches the
sellers, and to keep secret this order and the outcome of previous negotiations.
None of the above analyses connects the presence or absence of confidentiality to the
endogenous determination of product safety, which we do here.  We show that commitment to a
particular informational regime (confidentiality versus openness) influences a firm’s downstream
incentives to improve safety and a consumer’s willingness to purchase the product.  We characterize
the choice of regime, providing conditions such that, if the cost of credible auditing (to verify
openness) is low enough, a firm will choose to pay for the auditing and eschew confidentiality.
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Thus, if society were to ban (or substantially limit) the use of confidential settlements, then under
the relevant conditions, a firm would prefer this (as the cost of credible auditing would then be zero).
However, there may be conditions under which even free auditing would not make a firm prefer
openness, in which case it would prefer that the law allow confidential agreements.
Plan of the Paper
In Section 2 the model set-up, structure and notation are detailed.  In Section 3 we
characterize the equilibrium under openness or confidentiality, while Section 4 compares the
equilibria for the two regimes.  Section 5 examines the endogenous choice of regime.  The analysis
of these sections is under a parametric restriction that guarantees the existence of a (unique)
revealing equilibrium; Section 6 provides the essential results when only a pooling equilibrium
exists.  Section 7 summarizes the results and discusses the policy implications of banning or
allowing confidentiality.  Formal statements of the equilibria are in the Appendix while proofs,
derivations and supplementary material are provided in a Web Appendix available at (XXXX).
2.  Model Set-Up, Structure and Notation
We consider a two-period model of a firm producing a product with a safety attribute.
Within each period, three distinct interactions occur.  First, a firm chooses an input whose quality
affects the safety of its product.  Second, the firm chooses a price, which affects the purchasing
decisions of consumers.  Third, the firm engages in settlement negotiations with consumers who are
harmed by the product.    Prior to the start of Period 1, we assume that the firm has an opportunity
to choose the regime under which it will conduct its settlement negotiations:  the settlements are
confidential (denoted C) unless the firm has committed itself to a regime of openness (denoted O).
Commitment to a regime of openness will require a fixed expenditure on external monitoring.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art305
We describe each of these interactions, and the linkages between them both within and across
periods, in turn.  We begin by defining some notation that will be common to the two periods,  and
then we specify the timing and the information structure of the model.  We will indicate parameters
which are assumed to vary with the regime by a superscript “i,” where i = O or C.
Notation
Let 2 denote the quality of an input, such as a production technology.  We also identify 2
with the safety of a unit of the product produced by this technology, and interpret 2 as the
probability that the consumer uses the product without incident; that is, 2 is the probability that the
product does not cause harm.  We will also typically refer to 2 as the technology’s, the firm’s, or
the product’s “type.” Assume that 2 is distributed according to a continuously differentiable
distribution function, G(C), with positive density, g(C), on the interval [2, 2
G].  Let : / E(2) be the
expected value of 2.
We assume that the technology can also be employed in alternative activities for the firm,
should it not be fully-utilized in producing the primary product, which may generate a second
product or revenue stream for the firm.  In this alternative use, the technology generates profits for
the firm that are proportional (at the rate $) to its quality.
8  We assume that the firm makes more
profit when it produces the primary product, so the firm will only engage in the alternative activity
when consumer demand falls short of its capacity, which we denote by N.
9 Initial acquisition of the
technology, or its subsequent replacement, occurs at a cost denoted t.  For simplicity, we assume
there are no other costs associated with producing the product.
Let V denote the value of consumption of one unit of the product.  We assume that there are
N consumers (so the technology provides the capacity to serve the entire market), and that each
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consumer demands at most one unit.  Let the prevailing price for Period j be denoted pj, for j = 1,
2.  In order to determine her willingness to pay for the product, the consumer must form expectations
(or beliefs, depending upon the information available to her) about the likelihood that she will be
harmed by the product, and the associated losses she will bear.
In order to focus on other issues, we assume a simple litigation subgame structure.  In
particular, suppose that it is common knowledge that each harmed consumer (each plaintiff, denoted
P) suffers an injury in the amount *.
10  Under the assumption that the firm (the defendant, denoted
D) is strictly liable for the harms it causes, this is the amount of damages P would receive if
successful at trial.
11  However, merely knowing that one has been harmed by use of a product is not
sufficient to be successful at trial; rather, convincing evidence of causation is required, even under
strict liability.  We assume that there is a probability, denoted 8
i, that a consumer will be able to
provide convincing evidence.  With the complementary probability other intervening factors may
cloud the relationship between product use and harm, undermining the viability of the consumer’s
case.  We index the likelihood of a viable case by the regime to indicate that confidential versus
open settlement may affect the likelihood that a case is viable.  In particular, we assume that 8
C <
8
O; that is, one effect of confidential settlement (which usually results in a blanket gag order) is that
it prevents plaintiffs from learning about each other’s cases and possibly sharing information that
might improve the viability of their cases (see Hare, et. al., 1988; they argue that this is an important
reason for defendants to seek confidentiality).  Moreover, we assume that when a consumer
complains of harm to the firm, it is common knowledge (between the parties) whether the
consumer’s case is viable or not.  Thus, plaintiffs with non-viable cases receive nothing, while
plaintiffs with viable cases receive a settlement.  We assume that the amount of the settlement is
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art307
provided by finding the Nash Bargaining Solution to a complete information game, taking into
account the parties’ relevant costs of settlement versus trial.
12
We are assuming here that compensation is determined by the tort system, rather than by ex
ante contracting between the firm and a consumer.  In the case of injury, a firm cannot limit its
liability for a consumer’s harm through contractual means.  Under the penalty doctrine, the common
law does not enforce stipulated damages in excess of expected damages (Rea, 1998, p.24).  Thus,
the maximum value of enforceable stipulated damages would be *.  But then, assuming that the firm
cannot commit not to dispute causation (that is, the consumer would still have to be able to prove
that the firm’s product caused the consumer’s harm in order to have the contract enforced), the
consumer’s expected loss would be unchanged.  
Let kSP and kSD denote the costs of negotiating a settlement for P and D, respectively, and let
kTP and kTD denote the incremental costs of trial for P and D, respectively.  Since most product
liability suits involve a plaintiff’s attorney being paid a contingency fee, kSP is actually likely to be
substantial (from 1/4 to 1/3 of the settlement P receives), while the incremental costs of trial, kTP,
may be relatively small.  On the other hand, since the defendant is likely to pay his attorney an
hourly fee, kSD may be relatively small compared to the incremental cost of trial, kTD.  The model,
however, allows these costs to take on arbitrary values.  
Timing and Information Structure
Prior to the first period, the firm commits itself to a regime of either open, or confidential,
settlement negotiations.  A commitment to a regime of openness will require a public expenditure
on independent monitoring; failure to make such a costly and visible commitment results in an
inference that the firm will engage in confidential settlement.
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At the beginning of Period 1, the firm in regime i incurs R&D costs of t to acquire a
technology.  We assume that the realized value of 2 associated with this technology is not observed
by the firm until after the product has been sold and consumers begin reporting harm.  Thus the firm
sets its price p1 under symmetric, but imperfect, information vis-a-vis the consumer.  Consumers
make their purchase decisions, and some suffer harm.  We assume that all consumers report their
harms to the firm, seeking compensation, but only those with viable suits receive settlements.  At
this point, since harmed consumers are not aware of the totality of the complaints, only the firm is
able to construct the realized value of 2.
13
At the beginning of Period 2, it is now common knowledge that the firm knows the safety
of its own product.  If the firm is credibly committed to a policy of openness, then consumers can
costlessly ascertain the firm’s realized first period value of 2.  Furthermore, independent of its policy
of openness or confidentiality, if the firm chooses to replace its technology with a new one, we
assume that this is observable to consumers.  If the technology is replaced, then Period 2 plays out
the same as Period 1.  If the firm chooses to retain its Period 1 technology, then under a regime of
openness, consumers also know the product’s second-period safety.  However, under a regime of
confidentiality, since the consumer is uninformed about the product’s continuing level of safety, she
is at an informational disadvantage compared to the firm, and takes this into account in her
subsequent purchasing behavior.  In particular, she draws an inference about product safety from
the price p2 and bases her purchasing decision on this inference.  As in Period 1, consumers harmed
in Period 2 seek compensation and those with viable cases receive a settlement.
3.  Analysis of the Model under Alternative Regimes
We solve the model by backward induction.  We first characterize the settlement subgame
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art309
equilibrium, which is the same for both periods.  We then briefly discuss the alternative use of the
technology by the firm.  Then we characterize equilibrium play in Period 2, and then in Period 1,
first under the assumption of an open regime and then under a regime of confidentiality.
Settlement Subgame Equilibrium
By negotiating and settling rather than going to trial, P (respectively, D) individually spends
the amount kSP (respectively, kSD), but they jointly save the amount KT / kTP + kTD.  Thus, the
resulting Nash Bargaining Solution involves the plaintiff with a viable case receiving her
disagreement payoff, * - kSP - kTP, plus one-half of the saved incremental trial costs.  Therefore, the
plaintiff receives * - kSP - kTP + KT/2.  Similarly, the defendant pays his disagreement payoff,
14 less
one-half of the saved incremental trial costs, for a resulting payment of  * + kSD +  kTD - KT/2.  
Since not all cases are viable, we compute the continuation payoffs for the consumer and the
firm, conditional upon the consumer being harmed.  A harmed consumer will suffer a loss of * and
receive a settlement of * - kSP - kTP + KT/2 if she has a viable case, which occurs with probability 8
i
in regime i.  Thus, the expected loss borne by a harmed consumer in regime i, denoted LP
i, is given
by LP
i = * - 8
i(* - kSP - kTP + KT/2).  Similarly, the expected loss borne by the firm when a consumer
is harmed in regime i, denoted LD
i, is given by LD
i = 8
i(* + kSD +  kTD - KT/2).  We assume that each
party bears some loss; that is, LP
i > 0 and LD
i > 0.  For simplicity, let L
i denote the combined loss due
to consumer harm and settlement costs:  L
i / LP
i + LD
i =  * + 8
iKS, where KS / kSP + kSD.
Alternative Use of the Firm’s Technology
Recall that the firm can either produce the product with the safety attribute, or engage in
alternative productive activities with the same technology.  For example, a technology could be used
to produce both therapeutic drugs and multi-vitamins.  A “better” technology may promote greater
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safety when used to produce therapeutic drugs, and greater output when used to produce multi-
vitamins.  The social value of using a technology of type 2 to produce a unit of the primary product
is V - (1 - 2)L
i, while the social (and private) value of using the technology in an alternative activity
is given by $2. We make the following assumption regarding the parameters.
Assumption 1.  For i = O, C: (a) V > L
i > $; and (b) t < (: - 2)NL
i.
Part (a) implies that the net social value, V - (1 - 2)L
i - $2,  is positive for all 2 0 [2, 2
G] and
increasing in the safety of the product (since L
i > $).  This assumption is actually stronger than is
necessary; some product types with negative net social value could be accommodated.
15  Assumption
1(a) also implies that using the technology to produce the primary product is always more valuable
(socially) than using it in an alternative activity.  Part (b) implies that N[V - (1 -  :)L
i] - t > N[V-
(1 - 2)L
i], so it is preferable to acquire a new technology of unknown quality rather than to produce
with the worst technology.  For the analysis in Sections 3 - 5 we will further assume that $ > LD
C; the
alternative case will be taken up in Section 6.
Notice that, because each consumer has unit demand and the firm is a monopolist, the firm
will extract the full value of the product to the consumer as long as there is symmetric information
about 2.  Thus, in the case of a new technology (when noone knows 2), all consumers will want a
unit of the product at the symmetric-information monopoly price, and the firm’s entire capacity will
be devoted to producing the product.  In addition, in a regime of openness, the consumer and the
firm will both know the retained technology’s quality.  Thus, all consumers will want a unit of the
product at the full-information monopoly price and again the firm’s entire capacity will be devoted
to producing the product.  Only in the case of a confidential regime, in which asymmetric
information prevails, might the firm employ a portion of its capacity in an alternative activity.
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Equilibrium in a Regime of Openness
We solve the model by backward induction, first characterizing the equilibrium in Period 2
and then in Period 1.  Let 2j denote the quality of the technology in Period j, j = 1, 2.  If the
technology from Period 1 has not been replaced, then it is common knowledge (under an O regime)
that 22 = 21.  In this case, the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for the good is given by V -
(1 - 21)LP
O.  Thus, the firm will charge p2 = V - (1 - 21)LP
O and each consumer will buy one unit.  In
this case, since the firm’s capacity is exhausted by the demand for the primary product, no capacity
will be devoted to the alternative use.  Thus, the firm’s continuation profit from retaining a
technology of type 21, denoted A2
O(r; 21), is given by:  A2
O(r; 21) / N[V - (1 - 21)LP
O - (1 - 21)LD
O] =
N[V - (1 - 21)L
O].  Notice that, because the consumer adjusts her willingness to pay to account for
her potential downstream losses, the firm faces the full loss L
O.
If the technology has been replaced, then it is common knowledge that neither the firm nor
the consumer knows the true value of 22.  In this case, the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay
for the good is V - (1 - :)LP
O.  The firm will set p2 = V - (1 - :)LP
O and each consumer will buy one
unit.   The firm’s continuation profit from acquiring a new technology, denoted A2
O(n), is given by:
A2
O(n) / N[V - (1 -  :)LP
O - (1 -  :)LD
O] - t = N[V - (1 -  :)L
O] - t.
In making its retention decision at the beginning of Period 2, the firm compares A2
O(r; 21) to
A2
O(n), and retains the Period 1 technology whenever A2
O(r; 21) > A2
O(n); that is, whenever:
21 > 2
O / : - t/NL
O.( 1 )







        = {N[V - (1 -  :)L
O] - t}G(2
O) + I
ON[V - (1 - 21)L
O]g(21)d21,( 2 )
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where I
O indicates that the domain of integration is [2
O, 2
G]. 
The analysis of Period 1 is quite straightforward, since this period looks exactly like Period
2 when the firm acquires a new technology.  Thus, the firm’s profit from Period 1 on (that is, the
two-period profit under the O regime, gross of any monitoring costs it must pay to credibly commit
to O), denoted  A1
O, is given by:
A1
O / N[V - (1 -  :)L
O] - t + EA2
O
     = {N[V - (1 -  :)L
O] - t}(1 + G(2
O)) + I
ON[V - (1 - 21)L
O]g(21)d21.( 3 )
Equilibrium in a Regime of Confidentiality
Again, we begin with Period 2.  We sketch the derivation of a revealing perfect Bayesian
equilibrium; a formal statement is in the Appendix while the proof is in the Web Appendix.  Recall
that in a regime of confidentiality, information regarding Period 1 suits is not observable to
consumers in Period 2, as it has been suppressed through the use of confidentiality agreements.
16
Thus, if the technology has been retained, Period 2 consumers need to form beliefs about the
product’s safety based on choices made by the firm that are observable to Period 2 consumers.
These are (1) the firm’s decision to retain the technology, and (2) the firm’s choice of price for
Period 2.
   We assume that, upon observing that the firm has retained the technology from Period 1,
consumers believe that the firm’s type belongs to an interval [1, 2
G]; that is, the marginally-retained
technology is of type 1.  Thus, consumers believe that the firm would have retained the technology
if its quality were sufficiently high.  Moreover, upon observing that the firm is charging p2,
consumers believe that the firm’s type is b(p2; 1).  Since we will be characterizing a revealing
equilibrium, we employ “point beliefs” by specifying that b is a singleton rather than a set.  In a
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revealing equilibrium, the beliefs b(C; 1) will be correct, as will the conjectured value of 1.  
Since each firm would be tempted to inflate its price (if the consumer were to purchase a unit
for sure at every price), the consumer must respond to higher prices with increasing “wariness.”
That is, the consumer must confront higher prices with a lower probability of concluding a sale.  Let
s(p2; 1) denote the probability of a sale when the firm charges p2, given the conjectured value of 1.
The firm’s continuation payoff from retaining a technology of type 21, denoted A2
C(r; 21,  1), is:
A2
C(r; 21, 1) / maxp2
  Ns(p2; 1)[p2 - (1 - 21)LD
C] + N(1 - s(p2; 1))$21.( 4 )
The firm uses Ns(p2; 1) units of capacity to produce the primary product, and the remaining N(1 -
s(p2; 1)) units of capacity on the alternative activity, where each capacity unit yields a payoff of $21.
The first-order-condition for the firm’s problem is:
 sN[p2 - (1 - 21)LD
C - $21] + s = 0, (5)
where sN denotes the derivative of s(p2; 1) with respect to p2.  A consumer (who must randomize in
a revealing equilibrium) will only be willing to randomize if she is indifferent about buying; that is,
if V - (1 -  b(p2; 1))LP
C - p2 = 0.  Thus, the revealing equilibrium price must be p2 = p2*(21) / V - (1 -
21)LP
C.  In order to convert equation (5) to a differential equation in p2, we can solve for 21 as a
function of p2 to obtain 21 = (LP
C - V + p2)/LP
C.  Substituting this result into equation (5) yields an
ordinary differential equation for s(p2; 1).
 sN[p2(L
C - $) + $V - $LP
C - VLD
C] + sLP
C = 0. (6)
We also need a boundary condition to select among the family of solutions to the ordinary
differential equation (6).  Since the consumer believes that 1 is the worst type that would have been
retained, she anticipates strictly positive surplus from any out-of-equilibrium price p2 < p2*(1) = V -
(1 -1)LP
C, and thus would buy with probability 1 at such a price.
17  This in turn implies that she must
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buy with probability 1 at p2*(1) as well for, if she did not, then type 1 could profitably deviate to
some p2 < p2*(1).  Thus, the appropriate boundary condition is s(p2*(1); 1) = 1.  The solution to
the ordinary differential equation (6) through this boundary condition is given by:
 s(p2; 1) = {[p2*(1)(L




 + $V - $LP
C - VLD
C]}
", ( 7 )
where " / LP
C/(L
C - $) > 1 under our maintained assumption that $ > LD
C.  It can be shown that the
function s(p2; 1) is declining and convex in p2.  Upon substituting the firm’s optimal price function
p2*(21) = V - (1 - 21)LP
C into equation (7) and simplifying, we can write the equilibrium probability
of a sale as a function of the firm’s type.  Let s*(21; 1) / s(p2*(21); 1); then:
s*(21; 1) = {[V - (1 - 1)L
C - $1)]/[V - (1 - 21)L
C - $21)]}
".( 8 )
Observe what s*(21; 1) entails.  First, consider the ratio inside the braces.  The numerator is the net
social value associated with one unit produced by the marginally-retained type of technology; this
is also the net unit profit for the firm’s product (since welfare and profit are the same for this unit-
demand analysis).  Likewise, the denominator is the net unit profit for the firm’s product for a
retained technology of type 21 > 1.  Thus, this ratio is a fraction, the purpose of which is to reduce
the incentive for mimicry of high-type firms by low-type firms.  However, what the analysis tells
us is that this degree of wariness by the consumer is not sufficient to deter mimicry.  The exponent,
", which is LP
C/(L
C - $), reflects both the losses borne by the consumer (and greater losses should
make her more wary) as well as the degree of sensitivity of the firm to the consumer’s means for
responding to price increases.  Higher $ means that the firm’s alternative use of the technology is
proportionally more profitable, making the loss of a sale in response to a price increase less costly.
Recognizing this means that the consumer must be yet more wary.  This is why ", which is greater
than one, further amplifies the effect of the ratio inside the braces, so as to further deter mimicry.
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Since this is the unique revealing equilibrium, the resulting response by the consumer is both
necessary and sufficient to achieve revelation in equilibrium.  As will be seen in Section 6, if $ is
too low ($ < LD
C), then higher types of the firm will be overly-sensitive to the loss of sales due to a
price increase (which would reveal their higher safety), and pooling will result.
We can re-write the firm’s continuation profits as:
A2
C(r; 21, 1) = Ns*(21; 1)[p2*(21) - (1 - 21)LD
C] + N[1 - s*(21; 1)]$21
        = Ns*(21; 1)[V - (1 - 21)L
C - $21] + N$21,
where s*(21; 1) is as given in equation (8).  The equilibrium profits are increasing in 21; that is,
firms with safer products (equivalently, higher-quality technologies) make higher profits, despite
the fact that they face demand withdrawal from wary consumers.
Since firm profits are increasing in type, the form of the consumer’s beliefs about retention
is confirmed:  firms with higher-quality technologies will retain them, while firms with sufficiently
low-quality technologies will replace them.  If the technology was replaced rather than retained, then
it is common knowledge that neither the firm nor the consumer knows the true value of 22.
Analogously to this case in the O regime, the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for the good
is V - (1 - :)LP
C, the firm sets p2 = V - (1 - :)LP
C and each consumer buys one unit.   The firm’s
continuation profit from acquiring a new technology is:  A2
C(n) / N[V - (1 -  :)L
C] - t.






C(n).  That is, if the consumer conjectures that 2
C is the worst type of technology
retained, then the firm must be indifferent between retaining and replacing that type.  Since
s(p2*(2
C); 2




C) - (1 - 2
C)LD
C] = N[V - (1 - 2
C)LP
C - (1 - 2
C)LD
C] = N[V -
(1 - 2
C)L
C].  Setting this equal to A2
C(n) and solving for 2
C yields:
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 2
C / : - t/NL
C.( 9 )
Thus, under confidentiality, the firm retains the technology if 21 > 2
C, and otherwise replaces it.
Upon substituting 1 = 2
C into equation (8), we can finally write the reduced-form
equilibrium probability of a sale as a function of firm type 21 as follows:
 s*(21; 2
C) = {[V - (1 - 2
C)L
C - $2
C]/[V - (1 - 21)L
C - $21]}
". (10)
The following proposition (which is proved in the Web Appendix) summarizes the impact of several
parameters on the equilibrium probability of a sale.
Proposition 1.  The equilibrium probability of a sale is decreasing and convex in its argument
21; moreover, it is increasing in V, N and : and decreasing in $ and t.
The parameters V and $ enter s* directly; an increase in V makes the consumer less wary while (as
discussed earlier) an increase in $ increases the incentive for low types to mimic high types, thereby
increasing the consumer’s wariness.  N, : and t enter indirectly via 2
C; since consumers are less
wary when 2
C is higher, increases in N and : increase s* while increases in t reduce s*.  Revealing
equilibria do not normally depend on the distribution function (here, G), but only on the support
(here,  [2, 2
G]).  However, in this case the consumer’s beliefs about the support have been updated
(i.e., the type space is determined endogenously in this model), and the resulting probability of sale
function s*(21; 2
C) now depends on other attributes of the distribution (here, :) through 2
C.
Given the retention rule and the equilibrium strategies p2*(21) and s*(21; 2
C), we can write













C)[V - (1 - 21)L




C indicates that the domain of integration is [2
C, 2
G]. 
Again, the analysis of Period 1 looks exactly like Period 2 when the firm replaces its
technology.  Thus, the firm’s profit from Period 1 on (in the C regime), denoted  A1
C, is given by:
A1
C / N[V - (1 - :)L
C] - t + EA2
C
     = {N[V - (1 - :)L




C)[V - (1 - 21)L
C] + N[1 - s*(21; 2
C)]$21}g(21)d21. (12)
4.  Comparison of the Regimes
In this section, we compare the O and C regimes’ ex ante performance in terms of the
average quality of the technology in Period 2, the average safety of products sold in Period 2, the
volume of trade in Period 2, and the time path of the average safety of products sold.  Recall that the
retention threshold in regime i is given by 2
i / : - t/NL
i = : - t/N(* + 8
iKS).  Proposition 2
summarizes the effect of confidentiality on the decision to replace the technology and the expected
costs of R&D.
Proposition 2. 2
C < (=) 2
O as 8
C < (=) 8
O:  the technology retention threshold, and the
associated expected R&D investment, are lower in a confidential regime.
The expression E(22; 2
i) / :G(2
i) + I
i 2g(2)d2, where the domain of integration is  [2
i, 2
G],
denotes the average quality of the technology in Period 2 under regime i.  Since 22 = 21 when the
technology is retained, this can be re-written as:
E(22; 2
i) = : + I




i(21 - :)g(21)d21.  Since h(2) = 0 and hN(2
i) = -(2
i - :)g(2
i), it follows that hN(2
i) >
0 (and therefore that h(2
i) > 0) for all 2
i < :.  Since 2
C <  2
O < :, the following proposition
summarizes the average quality of the technology both within-regime but across periods, and within-
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Period 2 but across regimes.  This proposition indicates that technology quality improves over time,
but less so in a confidential regime than in an open regime. 
Proposition 3.  (a)  E(22; 2
i) > :, i = C, O:  the average quality of the technology improves
from Period 1 to Period 2.  (b)  E(22; 2
C) < (=) E(22; 2
O) as 8
C < (=) 8
O:  the average quality
of the technology in Period 2 is lower in a confidential regime than in an open regime.
  A similar question can be asked regarding the average safety of products sold (that is, the
quality-weighted number of units sold).  In an open regime, this measure in Period 2 is simply N
times the average quality of the technology in Period 2.  Let F(22; 2
O) = N: if 21 < 2
O and F(22; 2
O)
= N21 if 21 > 2
O.  Then E(F; 2
O) = N:G(2
O) + I
O N21g(21)d21 = N: + Nh(2
O).
However, since consumers respond to asymmetric information in a C regime by being wary
of purchasing (i.e., reducing the likelihood of a sale),  the average safety of products sold in Period
2 is more complicated.  Let F(22; 2
O) = N: if 21 < 2
C and F(22; 2
C) = N21s*(21; 2
C) if 21 > 2
C.  Then
E(F; 2





C)g(21)d21  = N: + I
CN[21s*(21; 2
C) - :]g(21)d21
< N: + I
CN[21 - :]g(21)d21 =  N: + Nh(2
C) <  N: + Nh(2
O) =  E(F; 2
O).
This is an interesting measure because it reflects both the decrease in sales volume, and the change
in composition, generated by confidentiality.  The effect of confidentiality on the average safety of
products sold in Period 2 is summarized below.
Proposition 4.E ( F; 2
C) < E(F; 2
O):  the average safety of products sold in Period 2 is lower
in a confidential regime than in an open regime.
This result holds even if 8
C = 8
O.  This is because there are two reasons why confidentiality
reduces the average safety of products sold in Period 2.  First, if 8
C < 8
O, then the average quality
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of technology will be lower in Period 2 under confidentiality (as compared to openness), so if a unit
were sure to be produced, it would be of lower average safety.  But even if 8
C = 8
O (so that retention
thresholds, R&D expenditures and the average quality of technology in Period 2 are the same for
the two regimes), the average safety of products sold in Period 2 will still be lower in a confidential
regime due to consumer wariness, since the equilibrium probability of a sale is lower for safer
products (since they have higher prices).
Indeed, rational consumer wariness can be so extreme that the average safety of products
sold in a confidential regime can actually decrease from Period 1 to Period 2 (we provide examples
of this below).  To ascertain parameter combinations (in terms of V and t/N) under which this is
likely to occur, we first note that E(F; 2
C) < N: if and only if I
CN[21s*(21; 2
C) - :]g(21)d21 < 0.
Let: 
H(V, t/N) / I
C[21s*(21; 2
C) - :]g(21)d21.
Then the average safety of products sold is the same in both periods when H(V, t/N) = 0.  Suppose
we begin at a parameter pair (V, t/N) at which H(V, t/N) = 0.  Then, since it can be shown (see the
Web Appendix) that MH/MV > 0 and MH/M(t/N) < 0, it follows that the average safety of products sold
is more likely to decline from Period 1 to Period 2 when V is low, or when t/N is high.  In particular,
this means that H(V, t/N) = 0 yields an increasing function when graphed in (V, t/N) space.
Some Examples Illustrating Declining versus Improving Intertemporal Safety Provision
It is difficult to explore H in more detail analytically, so we use some examples to illustrate
this surface between declining and improving intertemporal safety provision.  We now fix the region
of analysis and the parameter values.  Since 0 < 2
C < :, this means that 0 < t/NL
C < :.  Further, from
Assumption 1, we require V/L
C > 1; this is also the economically relevant region, since otherwise
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Figure 1:  The Effect of Mean-Preserving Spreads on the Change in
the Equilibrium Average Safety of Products Sold Under
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the Equilibrium Average Safety of Products Sold Under






the product potentially generates higher social costs than value.
18  Figure 1 below illustrates these
computations, for selected members of the family of Beta distributions (see Johnson and Kotz, 1970,
Chapter 24); that is G(2) = Beta(2; p, q), where we have chosen to use the parameter values (p,q)
to be (1,1), (2,2), and (3,3).  These (p,q) values provide symmetric distributions, all with mean equal
to ½, and with increasing “peakedness,” as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1 below.
In the figure the density functions are on the left, while (for each G) the boundary between
declining and improving intertemporal safety of the product sold is displayed on the right.  For
example, the case (p,q) = (1,1) is the uniform density, illustrated on the left of the figure.  The curve
on the right labeled (1,1), is the resulting H = 0 locus, which implicitly defines levels of t/NL
C, as
a function of V/L
C, that induce Period 2 average safety of products sold exactly equal to the average
safety of products sold in Period 1.  Points above this curve are associated (under the uniform
distribution) with declining intertemporal safety, while points below this curve are associated (under
the uniform distribution) with increasing intertemporal safety.  Thus, starting at a point on the curve,
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an increase in t results in a higher cost of R&D, a lower threshold 2
C and a lower value of s*(21; 2
C)
at any 21 > 2
C (see Proposition 1).  Such an increase results in sufficient demand reduction to make
the average safety of products sold in Period 2 lower than that of Period 1.  A reverse effect would
occur if we had increased V instead.  This same discussion applies for the other densities illustrated.
Figure 1 also suggests that a distribution G
~
 which is a mean-preserving spread of G (as, for
example, the distribution represented by (p,q) = (1,1) yields a mean-preserving spread of the
distribution represented by (p,q) = (2,2)) will result in an associated curve in (V/L
C,t/NL
C) space
which is everywhere higher than that curve associated with G. Unfortunately, we have not been
successful in characterizing when (or under what conditions on G) mean-preserving spreads provide
the dominance suggested by the right-hand-side panel of Figure 1.
19  However, this property is
intuitively reasonable.  A mean-preserving spread G
~
 of G places more weight on high types and on
low types than G does.  Now consider a specific level of t/NL
C (equivalently, fix a value of 2
C).
While a larger proportion of types under G
~
 is rejected due to 2
C than is rejected under G, more high
types are left, too.  Thus, for a given level of t/NL
C, H should be larger under G
~
 than under G for
higher values of V.  This is the pattern observed above.
5.  The Firm’s Choice of Regime
In this section, we compare the firm’s profitability under an open versus a confidential
regime.  In particular, we ask when a firm would find it profitable to eschew confidentiality in favor
of a regime of openness; we will also consider additional factors that affect this choice.
We re-write the firm’s ex ante expected profits, indexing profits in the open regime by 8
O.
Ex ante expected profits in an open regime, gross of any monitoring costs required to ensure credible
commitment to openness, are:
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A1
O(8
O) = {N[V - (1 - :)L
O] - t}(1 + G(2
O))  + I
ON[V - (1 - 21)L
O]g(21)d21. (14)
Ex ante expected profits in a confidential regime (suppressing 8
C, which is held fixed) are:
A1
C = {N[V - (1 - :)L




C)[V - (1 - 21)L
C] + N[1 - s*(21; 2
C)]$21}g(21)d21. (15) 
An open regime involves both costs and benefits relative to a confidential one.  The costs
of adopting an open regime involve paying more settlements (due to a higher fraction of viable
suits), as well as higher R&D costs (due to more frequent replacement of the technology) as
compared to a confidential regime.  In addition, a public expenditure is required to engage in a
credible commitment to openness.  On the other hand, a firm adopting a regime of openness need





C represent the maximum amount that a firm would be willing to pay













C)][V - (1 - 21)L
C - $21]}g(21)d21.  This expression is
clearly positive; thus, when openness does not increase the fraction of viable suits in comparison
with confidentiality, the firm would be willing to pay M(8
C) > 0 to ensure a credible commitment
to openness (e.g., to hire an external auditor).  As shown in the Web Appendix, MN(8
O) < 0 and
MO(8
O) > 0.  While M(8
O) may remain positive for all 8
O 0 [8
C, 1], it might also become negative
for sufficiently high 8
O.  These properties of M(8
O) are summarized below in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5.  M(8
C) > 0; MN(8
O) < 0 and MO(8
O) > 0 for all 8
O 0 [8
C, 1].
In Figure 2 below, we illustrate two cases.  The case in which M(8
O) remains positive for
all 8
O 0 [8
C, 1] is illustrated using a solid line, while the case in which M(8
O) eventually falls below
zero is illustrated using a dashed line; in this case, let 8
^ be such that M(8
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credible monitoring, denoted m, is less than M(8
O), then the firm itself will choose an open regime.
If m > M(8
O) > 0, then the firm would prefer a regime of openness (if monitoring were costless), but
is unwilling to pay the required amount.  Finally, if M(8
O) < 0, then the firm would prefer a
confidential regime, even if credible monitoring were costless.
The Impact of Loss-Shifting on the Choice of Regime
In either regime, the firm currently faces an expected loss of LD
i for each harmed consumer,
while the consumer herself faces an expected loss of LP
i if harmed by the product.  The combined
losses are L
i = * + 8
iKS.  One variation of interest would be to shift some of the firm’s losses to the
consumer, holding total losses constant.  For instance, recently-imposed limits on compensatory
damages for pain and suffering would have this effect.  While the expected harm remains
unchanged, the expected award is reduced by the caps.
If some of the firm’s losses were shifted to the consumer, while total losses were held
constant, then A1
O(8
O) would be completely unchanged, since it depends on the losses only through
L
O, which is being held fixed.  On the other hand, A1
C depends upon both L
C, which is being held
fixed, and on LP
C, through the exponent in s*(21; 2
C), which was denoted by ".  Thus, to determine
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the effect on M(8
O; ") / A1
O( 8
O) - A1
C(") of a shift of losses from D to P, holding total losses fixed,
we need only determine the sign of MM/M" = - MA1
C/M".  Differentiating equation (15) with respect
to " = LP
C/(L
C - $), holding L
C fixed, yields: 
-MA1
C/M" =  -I
CN(Ms*(21; 2
C)/M")[V - (1 - 21)L
C - $21]g(21)d21. (16)
The integrand is negative for all 21 0 (2
C, 2
G], since Ms*(21; 2
C)/M" = s*(21; 2




C]/[V - (1 - 21)L
C - $21]} < 0.  Thus, an increase in LP
i, holding L
i fixed (i.e., an increase in "),
increases M(8
O;") for all 8
O.  A firm is willing to pay more for openness as LP
C increases because
this shift makes consumers more wary, and the further reduction in their purchases (in a C regime)
makes confidentiality less appealing.  Alternatively, a shift of losses from P to D (through shifting
of settlement costs or awarding multiple damages) will reduce consumer wariness and thus make
confidentiality more attractive to the firm.
Impact of Liability for Third-Party Harms on the Firm’s Choice of Regime
If a product is subject to failure causing harm, it need not harm only those who purchased
the product.  Often there will be innocent bystanders or other third parties who are also harmed.  For
instance, when a defective gun misfires, both the user and nearby individuals are at risk.  Similarly,
when a defective part in an automobile fails, the resulting crash may injure both the driver and third
parties (passengers, people in other vehicles, pedestrians).  According to tort law for products
liability, “... the courts have almost unanimously allowed recovery for bystanders where injury to
them is reasonably foreseeable, ...” (See Keeton, et. al., 1989, p. 179).
We could define parameters for third-party victims that are analogous to * and 8
i, which
would result in expressions analogous to LP
i, LD
i and L
i, but this complicates the exposition
unnecessarily.  Rather, we will assume that these parameters are the same for consumer victims and
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third-party victims, and we will simply assume that the consumption of one unit by a consumer




i = (1 + N)LD








i + (1 + N)LD
i.  Moreover, each of the N individuals per consumer also faces a loss of LP
i,
which does not get transmitted back through the market or the legal system to the firm.  Thus, we
can conclude immediately that M2
i/MN > 0; an increase in third-party exposure increases the retention
threshold.  However, since the uncompensated losses borne by the third parties are not reflected in
market prices or firm liability costs, the retention threshold increases less than it should.  Note that,




   We can now write the firm’s maximum willingness to pay for a credible commitment to
openness as M(8
O; N) / A1
O(8
O; N) - A1
C(N) and ask how an increase in N (that is, greater liability
for third-party losses) affects the firm’s preference between the O and C regimes.  First note that
M(8
O; N) is of the same form as before (except that L
i and LD





Thus, for any fixed value of N the graph of M(8
O; N) looks similar to that displayed in Figure 2.
Notice also that A1




C; N) - I
CN[1 - s*(21; 2
C)][V - (1 - 21)L
~C - $21]g(21)d21. (17)
This implies that M(8
O; N) is of the form:
M(8
O; N) =  A1
O(8




CN[1 - s*(21; 2
C)][V - (1 - 21)L
~C - $21]g(21)d21. (18)
While we are unable to determine the sign of MM(8
O; N)/MN for all values of 8
O, we can
provide sufficient conditions for MM(8
O; N)/MN < 0 for 8
O sufficiently close to 8
C.  The derivatives
of the first two terms in equation (18) cancel out when 8
O = 8
C; moreover, the derivative involving
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the lower limit of integration in the third term is also zero (upon recalling that 1 - s*(2
C; 2
C) = 0).
Since the second bracketed term in the integrand is decreasing in N, the derivative of the integrand
will be negative if Ms*(21; 2




C + (1 + N)LD
C directly, through 2
C = : - t/NL
~C and through " = LP
C/(L
~C - $).  In
the Web Appendix we derive a sufficient condition for Ms*(21; 2




Under the condition that Ms*(21; 2
C)/MN > 0 for all 21, an increase in the firm’s liability costs
associated with third-party harms permits the consumers to moderate their wariness.  Essentially,
incentives for the firm to reveal its type come from two sources: lawsuits (either from consumers
or third parties) and demand reduction on the part of consumers.  When the firm faces higher costs
of dealing with third parties’ lawsuits, the consumers need not engage in as much demand reduction;
they can “free ride” on the third-party lawsuits.  This reduction in consumer wariness increases the
firm’s sales in a C regime, making confidentiality more profitable, at least for  8
O in a neighborhood
of 8
C.  While this intuition seems plausible as 8








OMN, whose dependence on 8
O is complex.
6.  Analysis of the Confidential Regime when $ < LD
C
In the interests of brevity, we now report on the case of $ < LD
C, wherein a revealing
equilibrium fails to exist (See Claim 2 in the Appendix; complete details of this analysis, and
associated proofs, are provided in the Web Appendix).  Let :(1) / I21g(21)d21/(1 - G(1)), where
the integration is over 21 0 [1, 2
G], be the expected value of 21 when the consumer believes 21 0
[1, 2




CP equates the firm’s profits if the input is retained to those if it replaces the input at a cost of t:
N[V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C - (1 - 2
CP)LD
C] = N[V - (1 - :)L
C] - t. (20)
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Since N[V - (1 - :(2
C))LP
C - (1 - 2
C)LD
C] > N[V - (1 - :)L
C] - t, equation (20) implies that the retention
threshold when $ < LD
C (i.e., in the pooling equilibrium) is yet lower than the retention threshold
when $ > LD
C (i.e., in the revealing equilibrium); that is, 2
CP < 2
C, and thus, 2
CP < 2
O.  All of the
previous propositions apply to the pooling case, and M(8
O) is as depicted earlier.
7.  Summary and Policy Implications
We provide a simple model illustrating the tradeoffs facing a firm choosing between a regime
of open versus confidential settlements.   Focusing on the revealing equilibrium, we find that an
open regime involves higher liability costs and higher R&D costs, while a confidential regime
involves consumer wariness, which exacts a cost associated with signaling safety.  We identify
circumstances under which the firm would be willing to pay for a credible commitment to openness.
Is it reasonable to posit firms paying for independent auditing to guarantee credibility of a
commitment to openness?  As mentioned in the Introduction, in the GE-Westinghouse competition
in large turbine generators in the 1960's and 1970's, GE ended up doing just that:  they employed
an accounting firm to monitor all contracts and provide independent authority that GE was adhering
to an announced “most-favored-customer” policy which gave full rebates to early buyers from any
price cuts provided to later buyers.  This was the means by which GE and Westinghouse stabilized
otherwise intense price competition which repeatedly had involved secret price concessions.
21
We have taken the liability regime as given (strict liability, in which the firm is allocated the
liability for harm caused).  However, the use of the court system is costly in this model.  In the case
of two parties in an open regime, the market would transfer liability even if it were not nominally
imposed on the firm, suggesting perhaps that one should not assign liability to the firm.  But this is
a misleading special case.  In the two-party case in a confidential regime, shifting liability to
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consumers worsens consumer wariness.  While the retention decision still reflects the full social
costs, the volume of trade will be further reduced.  In the three-party case in either regime, the
retention threshold is already too low, and would be made worse if the firm bears no liability.
Moreover, the effect on the volume of trade in a confidential regime is even worse, since firm
liability for third party harms substitutes for consumer wariness; without this liability, consumer
wariness would increase.  Finally, we note that some markets may involve downward-sloping
demand, in which case the marginal unit produced should reflect the full social costs.
At the beginning of the paper we noted that judges and legislatures are considering banning
confidentiality.  Both the feasibility and the optimality of banning confidentiality are problematical.
In order to truly eliminate confidentiality, courts would have to refuse to seal documents and
settlements.  In addition, they would have to refuse to enforce private contracts of silence.
Otherwise, confidential settlements would simply be pushed into this area of contracts, where they
would be subject to even less judicial oversight.
22
Under what circumstances might it be welfare-improving to ban confidentiality?  While our
simple model is inadequate to provide a full answer, some suggestive results emerge.  Again we
focus on the revealing equilibrium for brevity (and some results, which we note below, differ for the
pooling equilibrium).  For the two-party case, the firm’s retention choice is based on full liability
costs, so it chooses the correct threshold in both regimes.
23  Moreover, since the firm extracts all the
surplus, confidentiality (and the concomitant lower product quality) can be Pareto superior to
openness.  If the firm’s willingness to pay for openness is positive, the firm itself would presumably
support a ban on confidentiality, while it would oppose such a ban when it prefers confidentiality.
For the three-party case, the firm’s retention choice is not based on full liability costs (since
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third parties bear uncompensated losses), so the resulting threshold is too low in both regimes.
Preferences of the parties are complicated.  Third parties always prefer an open regime, conditional
on being harmed; they also always prefer an open regime in the pooling equilibrium, and thus
confidentiality cannot be Pareto superior in that case.  Hoowever, in the revealing equilibrium, on
an ex ante basis, third parties prefer confidentiality when 8
O is close to 8
C.  This is because the
extent of third party recovery is the same, but consumer wariness in the confidential regime reduces
the exposure of third parties to harm.  Third parties’ preference for confidentiality occurs in the
portion of the parameter space wherein the firm and the consumer (weakly) prefer an open regime.
When 8
O is substantially larger than 8
C, it seems likely that third parties will, ex ante, prefer
openness, yet this is the portion of the  parameter space wherein the firm and the consumer (weakly)
prefer confidentiality.  Thus, confidentiality seems unlikely to be Pareto superior to openness.
  Finally, casual observation indicates that, from the perspective of products liability:  1)  few
(if any) firms commit to openness; and 2) most consumers (if newspaper accounts and recent
legislative ire are indicative) are only now becoming aware of confidentiality’s widespread use.
24
Increasing awareness of the widespread use of confidentiality suggests that consumers will become
more wary.  Firms employing confidentiality can then expect to suffer either reduced demand (in
the case of the revealing equilibrium), or a lower expected second-period price (in the case of the
pooling equilibrium).  Thus, firms should increasingly find it preferable to eschew confidentiality,
and they could be assisted by the private provision of specialized auditing services, by well-tailored
sunshine laws and by increased judicial restraint with respect to issuing protective and sealing
orders, all of which would lower the cost of achieving a credible commitment to openness.
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Appendix A
Definition.  A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (in a confidential regime) consists of:
(a) beliefs 1 and b(p2; 1) f [1, 2
G] for the consumer; 
(b) a probability of sale function s(p2; 1) for the consumer; and 
(c) a retention threshold 2
C and a price function p* 2 (21) for retained technologies such that: 
(i)  s(p2; 1) maximizes the consumer’s expected payoff, given her beliefs 1 and b(p2; 1); 
(ii)  p* 2(21) and the retention threshold 2
C maximize the firm’s expected payoff, given s(p2; 1); and
(iii) beliefs are correct in equilibrium; that is, 1 = 2
C and b(p* 2(21); 2
C) = 21 for all 21 0 [2
C, 2
G].
Claim 1.  When $ > LD
C, then:  (a)  The following beliefs and strategies provide a revealing perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in a confidential regime; and (b) this is the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium that survives refinement using D1 (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
(i)  Upon observing that the technology was retained, the consumer believes that 1 = : - t/NL
C.
Upon observing a price p2 0 [V - (1 -  1)LP
C, V - (1 -  2
G)LP
C], the consumer believes that 21 is given
by b(p2; 1) = 1 - (V - p2)/LP
C.  Upon observing a price outside this interval, the consumer’s beliefs
are arbitrary elements of [1, 2
G].
(ii) The probability of sale function is s(p2; 1) = {A/B}
", where A = V - (1 - 1)LP




C - $], B = p2 + [$V - $LP
C - VLD
C]/[L
C - $], and " = LP
C/(L
C - $) > 1, for  p2 0 [V - (1 - 1)LP
C,
V - (1 -  2
G)LP
C].  Note that A > 0, B > 0 and B > A for all p2 0 [V - (1 - 1)LP
C, V - (1 -  2
G)LP
C].  For p2
< V - (1 - 1)LP
C, the probability of sale is s(p2; 1) = 1 and for p2 > V - (1 - 2
G)LP
C, the probability of
sale is s(p2; 1) = 0.
(iii) The retention threshold is 2
C =  : - t/NL
C; that is, technologies with 21 <  : - t/NL
C are replaced,
while those with  21 >  : - t/NL
C are retained.  The price function for products produced by retained
technologies is p* 2(21) = V - (1 - 21)LP
C for 21 0 [2
C, 2
G].
Claim 2.  When $ < LD
C, then any perfect Bayesian equilibrium must involve pure pooling.  The
following beliefs and strategies provide a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that survives D1.
Technically, any price p2 0 [V - (1 - 2
CP)LP
C, V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C] can be supported as a PBE since
upward deviations are inferred to come from type 2
CP, and are therefore rejected.  However, the PBE
specified below is the natural analog of that characterized in Section 3. 
i)  Upon observing that the technology was retained, the consumer believes that 1 = 2
CP, which is
defined implicitly (and uniquely) by N[V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C - (1 - 2
CP)LD
C] = N[V - (1 -  :)L
C] - t.  Upon
observing the price p2 = V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C, the consumer believes 21 0 [2
CP, 2
G] and is distributed
according to g(21)/(1 - G(2
CP)) on this interval.  Upon observing a price p2 < V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C, the
consumer may entertain arbitrary beliefs, and upon observing a price p2 > V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C, the
consumer believes that 21 = 1 = 2
CP.
(ii) The consumer buys with probability one for p2 = V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C, and buys with probability
zero for p2 > V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C. The consumer buys according to her beliefs for p2 < V - (1 -
:(2
CP))LP
C (since she buys for sure at p2 = V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C, no firm type will ever price lower).
(iii) The retention threshold is 2
CP as defined above; that is, technologies with 21 < 2
CP are replaced,
while those with 21 > 2
CP are retained.  The price function for products produced by retained
technologies is p* 2(21) = V - (1 - :(2
CP))LP
C, for all 21 0 [2
CP, 2
G].
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1.  See the Manual for Complex Litigation, Third Edition (1995), section 21.431-432, for details on
protective orders (which provide for sealing of discovery and subsequent materials).  The Manual,
which is published by the Federal Judicial Center, is a case management guide for judges. See
Garfield (1998) for a discussion of contracts of silence.
2.  See Hare, et. al., (1988), a text for attorneys on obtaining/opposing confidentiality orders; they
indicate that seeking such orders in products liability cases is “routine.”  See also Nissen (1994).
3.  See Boston Globe (2002) on the employment of confidential settlements by the Catholic
Archdiocese of Boston.  Weiser and Walsh (1988a,b,c,d) unearthed a number of examples wherein
confidential settlements have been used, including:  products liability in the automobile (GM’s gas
tank placement) and pharmaceutical (Pfizer’s Feldene and McNeil’s Zomax) industries; professional
malpractice (by doctors, nurses, lawyers and hospitals); safety hazards in public facilities; and race-
and sex-based employment discrimination cases.
4.  An example of a firm paying for a credible commitment to openness is discussed in Porter and
Ghemawat (1980) and Porter (1980a,b); we return to this example in Section 7 below.
5.  See, for example, Collins (2002).  Such court-instigated changes, and some recently-considered
state “sunshine” statutes (with the exception of one enacted in Texas), generally do not apply to
unfiled agreements (see Gale Group, 2003).  Thus, contracts of silence with penalties for breach
would likely still be enforceable.
6.  In addition, some argue that using courts to resolve private settlement contract disputes implies
a public right of access to judicial proceedings; see, Dore (1999) and Herrnreiter v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 281 F.3d 634, 636-637 (7
th Circuit, 2002).
7. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) first considered a formal model of a monopoly signaling
unobservable quality via price and advertising; see also Hertzendorf (1993), which assumes
imperfectly-observed advertising.  Some papers have considered quality signaling via price and
adverstising when there are competitive forces, either because of entry deterrence considerations
(e.g., Linnemer, 1998) or in response to existing rivalry (e.g., Hertzendorf and Overgaard, 2001, and
Fluet and Garella, 2002). 
8.  If this activity involves production of an alternative product, we assume that its sale takes place
after the primary product has been sold.  That is, consumers of the primary product cannot observe
2 by monitoring the alternative activity prior to making their purchase decisions.
9.  We also assume that the firm has a managerial capacity of N, so it will only run one “plant.”
10.  If harm is stochastic, but verifiable at settlement, then * can be viewed as the expected harm.
Endnotes
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11.  This paper takes the liability regime as given.  Although scholars, judges and policymakers have
debated the desirability of “tinkering” with the system around the margins (e.g., with respect to
confidentiality, and various marginal re-allocations of liability through damages caps and fee-
shifting), to our knowledge there is no serious contemplation of wholesale changes in the allocation
of liability or in the use of settlement as alternative dispute resolution.  There are many arguments
that support allocating liability for harm to the firm (when its choices govern safety; see, e.g.,
Shavell, 1987).  Since the liability system is generated by broader considerations than are captured
in our simplified model of a single market (and broader, even, than economic considerations), it
seems appropriate to treat it as exogenous here.
12.  Since settlement and litigation are represented by a complete information game, there will be
no trials.  Empirically, a high percentage of suits result in settlement (or are withdrawn); see Gross
and Syverud (1996) or Dore (1999).  Theoretically, the model could be extended to allow for
settlement bargaining failure, such as might result under asymmetric information (e.g., if the level
of damages were private information for each plaintiff); see Hay and Spier (1998) or Daughety
(2000) for surveys of this literature.  The possibility of trial would mean that even under
confidentiality, there would be some possibility of consumers using this to update their estimate of
2, which would substantially complicate the analysis of the model; we abstract from this possibility.
13.  Under the assumption of a large, but finite, number of consumers, the estimate of 2 will be
inexact.  Alternatively, we could assume a continuum of consumers of measure N; in this case, the
estimate of 2 will be exact.  While the model can accommodate either interpretation, we will treat
the estimate of  2 as exact, but continue to speak of N as the “number” of consumers because this
is less technical and more intuitive.
14.  Here D’s disagreement payoff does not include effects on his continuation payoffs.  None arise
in an open regime (or in Period 2 in either regime).  We abstract from such effects in a confidential
regime as well, under the assumption that any single P choosing trial has a negligible effect on 8
C
and on the consumer’s estimate of 2 (e.g., trial establishes that D’s product harmed this P, but does
not reveal the extent of others who might have been harmed).  Alternatively, if D has all the
bargaining power, each P settles for her disagreement payoff (D’s disagreement payoff is irrelevant).
15.  For example, if there exists 2N > 2 such that V - (1 - 2)L
i - $2 < 0 for all 2 0 [2, 2N), then none
of the analysis below would change, provided that 2N < 2
C, a cutoff level to be determined in the
discussion of the incomplete information model of the confidentiality regime.  If 2N > 2
C, that
analysis would be substantially more complex.
16.  While consumers harmed in Period 1 who did not have viable suits are not constrained by a
confidentiality agreement, neither can they prove their harm was due to use of the product.
17.  These out-of-equilibrium beliefs (b(p2; 1) 0 [1, 2
G]) assume that the retention decision was made
correctly, but an error in pricing occurred.  If an error were made in retention instead, the firm has
the ability subsequently to choose the best price in the range of those expected by the consumer,
which would be p2*(1) for any 21 < 1, at which a sale to the consumer is certain (and more
profitable than a sure sale at any p2 < p2*(1)).  Thus, assuming that the probability of double-
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mistakes is zero, it is reasonable to make this assumption about beliefs.
18.  In the computations below:  1) 1 < V/L
C < 3; 2) LP
C/L
C = 0.5; and 3) [2, 2
G] = [0, 1].  Note that
LP
C/L
C = 0.5 and $ > LD
C implies that $/L
C > 0.5; we have chosen to use $/L
C = 0.6.  Runs with higher
values of $/L
C gave very similar results.  The calculations were performed using Mathematica 4.2.
19.  In the Web Appendix we investigate some Beta distributions which are left- or right-skewed,
and they evidence the same mean-preserving-spread property for the associated H = 0 curves. 
20.  This condition is -(V - L
~C)ln{(V - L
~C)/(V - $)} - (L
~C - $) + (t/N)((L
~C - $)/L
~C)
2 > 0.  This is a very
strong (but non-empty) sufficient condition, ensuring against the worst of the worst-case scenarios,
namely when : is as small as possible (i.e., : = t/NL
~C), making 2
C = 0, and when 2
G = 1.
21.  The practice continued from 1963 until the Justice Department objected and threatened suit in
1975.  See Porter and Ghemawat (1980) and Porter (1980 a,b).
22.  But see Weiser (1989) for an example of the use of judicially-supervised sealing that prevented
information about leaks of trichloroethylene, a suspected carcinogen, by the Xerox Corporation’s
Webster (NY) plant, into the groundwater.  The court’s sealing order on the settlement between
plaintiffs and Xerox limited the ability of victims to cooperate with public health agencies. 
23.  By “correct,” we mean the same threshold as would be chosen by a social planner who is
constrained to the same timing and information as the firm, and is subject to the firm’s subsequent
pricing behavior.
24.  Confidential settlement recently figured in the Ford/Firestone product recalls.  Womeldorf and
Cravens (2001) report that “One consequence of the recent Firestone recalls has been a resurgence
of legislative proposals aimed at ferreting out ‘secrecy’ in litigation.”
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